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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Lonnie L. Allen appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss or 
reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor and the denial of his motion to seal his 
criminal case file, arguing that the court abused its discretion in both. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Allen argued with his girlfriend, AN.A, over drinks. (B/25/2009 Bennett Report, 
pp.2-4 (appended to PSI).) The argument eventually escalated to the point where he 
grabbed her, pulled her across him into his car, and drove her away from town. (Id.) 
While driving, Allen violently and repeatedly battered AN.A., causing her a concussion, 
a spinal injury, and visible neck contusions, and threatened to post a sex video of 
AN.A online. (ld., pp.1-3.) After a failed attempt to call 911, AN.A fled from Allen on 
foot and, while he pursued her, they were spotted by an Idaho State Trooper. (Id.; see 
also B/26/2009 Yount Report, p.B (appended to PSI).) 
The state charged Allen with attempted strangulation and second degree 
kidnapping. (R, pp.B1-B2.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Allen entered an Alford1 
plea to attempted strangulation and the state dismissed the kidnapping charge. (R, 
pp.116-32; see also R, p.115.) On January 13, 2010, the district court entered 
judgment against Allen, imposing a suspended sentence of three years with one year 
fixed and placing Allen on probation for three years. (R, pp.144-4B.) 
On September 9,2010, the state alleged that Allen had violated his probation by 
lying on two polygraph examinations, consuming alcohol, and frequenting a bar. (R, 
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
1 
pp.156-57.) Allen admitted that he violated his probation by consuming alcohol, and the 
state dismissed the other violations. (See R. pp.177-78, 187.) The district court found 
that Allen violated his probation, but continued his probation, ordering that he serve 
eight days in the county jail. (R., pp.187-88.) 
On December 2, 2011, Allen filed motions to terminate his probation early, to set 
aside his probation violation, and to reduce or dismiss his felony conviction under Idaho 
Code § 19-2604. (R., pp.190-95.) The district court denied the motions but allowed 
Allen's probation to be converted to an unsupervised probation. (R., pp.200-01.) Later, 
Allen filed a motion to terminate his unsupervised probation early and renewed his 
motions to set aside his probation violation and reduce his felony conviction. (See R., 
p.206-07, 209.) The district court granted Allen's motion for early termination but 
required him to submit additional briefing in support of the renewed motions. (R., 
pp.212-13.) After receiving the supplemental briefing, finding that a reduction of Allen's 
felony conviction was not compatible with the public interest, the district court denied 
both motions. (R., pp.250-58.) Allen filed a motion for reconsideration and a separate 
motion to seal his criminal file. (R., pp.259-78.) After a hearing, the district court denied 
both motions. (R., pp.282-92.) Allen filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.293-95.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Allen states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was the decision to deny Mr. Allen's Idaho Code § 19-2604 motion 
due to it not being compatible with public interest despite his substantial 
compliance with probation an abuse of discretion? 
2. Was the decision to deny Mr. Allen's motion to seal a case file that 
contains highly intimate material about multiple parties and has caused 
financial hardship to Mr. Allen an abuse of discretion? 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Allen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his request to dismiss or reduce his felony conviction where Allen was ineligible for relief 
under Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 )(a) due to his adjudicated probation violation, and where 
the district court found that, in any case, such a reduction was not compatible with the 
public interest? 
2. Has Allen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his request to seal his criminal case file where it determined that the public interest in 




The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Allen's Motion To Dismiss 
Or Reduce His Felony Conviction To A Misdemeanor 
A. Introduction 
After a period of probation, Allen filed a motion to dismiss or reduce his felony 
conviction pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604. (R., pp.194-95; 215-24.) The district 
court determined that, under the circumstances of this case, a dismissal or reduction of 
Allen's felony conviction was not compatible with the public interest, and so denied the 
motion. (R., pp.250-58.) On appeal, Allen argues that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion to dismiss or reduce his felony conviction. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.7-13.) Allen's argument fails on two independent bases: First, application of 
the correct legal standards to the facts of this case shows that the district court lacked 
authority to grant Allen's motion. Second, even assuming, arguendo, that the district 
court could legally grant relief, Allen has still failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The determination of whether to grant relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604 rests 
within the discretion of the district court. State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580, 581, 249 
P.3d 379, 380 (2011). 
C. Allen Was Ineligible For Relief Under Idaho Code § 19-2604, And The District 
Court Correctly Determined That Dismissing Or Reducing Allen's Felony 
Conviction Was Incompatible With The Public Interest 
Whether to dismiss or reduce a felony conviction is governed by Idaho Code § 
19-2604 which provides, in pertinent part, 
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(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has 
been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory 
showing that: 
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any 
probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of 
the terms or conditions of probation ... 
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer 
cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with 
the public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or 
conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the 
defendant or may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the 
custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" 
for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended 
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction .... 
I.C. § 19-2604(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
1. Because Allen Violated His Probation, The District Court Lacked Legal 
Authority To Grant Allen Relief Under Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 )(a) 
As a threshold matter, under Idaho Code § 19-2604 as it existed when Allen 
sought relief, a district court was only permitted to dismiss or amend a felony conviction 
to a misdemeanor upon a showing that "[t]he court did not find, and the defendant did 
not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated any of the 
terms or conditions of probation." I.C. § 19-2604(1 )(a). In this case, the district court 
found, and Allen admitted, that Allen violated his probation. (See R., pp.184-85, 187.) 
Under the plain language of the statute, Allen was therefore not eligible for a dismissal 
or reduction of his felony conviction. The district court did not have legal authority to 
grant Allen a dismissal or reduction of his felony conviction, and the district court cannot 
be said to have abused its discretion by denying relief which the district court lacked 
legal authority to grant. 
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2. Because Granting Allen Relief Under Idaho Code § 19-2604 Was Not 
Compatible With The Public Interest, The District Court Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion By Denying Allen's Motion 
Though the district court lacked legal authority to grant Allen's motion, it still 
reached the merits of that motion and determined that granting Allen's motion to dismiss 
or reduce his felony conviction was not compatible with the public interest and so 
denied the motion on that basis. (R., pp.256-58.) In determining that the requested 
dismissal or reduction was not compatible with the public interest, the district court 
considered the goals of rehabilitation and protection of society. (Id.) Ultimately, it 
concluded that "the severity of the underlying crime and the method of its 
accomplishment militate[d] against either the dismissal of the judgment of conviction or 
a reduction to a misdemeanor." (R., pp.256-58.) 
The district court's determination is supported by the record. In the instant 
offense, Allen went out for drinks with a girlfriend, AN.A (8/25/2009 Bennett Report, 
pp.2, 4.) During an ensuing argument, Allen stole AN.A.'s phone. (ld.) When AN.A. 
later confronted Allen in the parking lot, Allen grabbed her by the front of her shirt and 
dragged her across him into his car. (ld., p.3.) As Allen drove AN.A away from town, 
he yelled at her and battered her, grabbing her by her hair and her throat. (Id.) Allen 
also threatened to post a sex tape of AN.A online. (ld., p.1.) When they arrived at the 
location where they were later found by police, Allen demanded that AN.A exit the car. 
(ld., p.3.) Fearing for her life, she refused. (Id.) Allen grabbed AN.A by her throat in a 
strangulation hold. (Id., pp.3-4.) He then removed the keys from the ignition, took 
AN.A.'s purse, and left to put the purse by the train tracks. (ld.) AN.A attempted to 
call 911 on Allen's phone, but before she could complete the call Allen returned and 
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slammed her against the passenger side of the car. (Id., p.3.) A.N.A., with nothing to 
lose, then exited the vehicle and fled on foot where she was spotted by Trooper Yount, 
with Allen chasing her from behind. (ld., pp.1, 3; see also 8/26/2009 Yount Report, p.8.) 
Allen disputes the district court's determination that relief under Idaho Code § 19-
2604 would be incompatible with the public interest, arguing that "[n]ot granting Idaho 
Code § 19-2604 relief continues the convicted criminal label, decreases the ability to be 
successful, and may cause an individual to lose out on educational and employment 
opportunities." (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Allen asserts that this will cause criminals to 
recidivate, placing a burden on the public. (Id., pp.9-10.) This argument is unavailing. 
"[P]ublic interest refers to that [in] which the public or the community at large has an 
interest." State v. Dieter, 153 Idaho 730, 735, 291 P.3d 413, 418 (2012). "It is not 
enough that the action results in benefits to the public; it must be pursued with the 
purpose of benefiting the public." !s:t. (quoting State v. Hagerman Water Rights Owners, 
Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 726, 947 P.2d 391, 399 (1997)). Whether continuing Allen's label 
as a criminal convict causes him to forfeit educational or employment opportunities is a 
private, not public, interest, even if it might provide some tangential benefit to the public. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that allowing Allen a dismissal of his felony conviction 
could be compatible with the public interest, his argument is still unavailing. The public 
interest benefits more from the protection of society, as found by the district court, and 
"continu[ing] the convicted criminal label" on a violent felon increases that protection. 
Furthermore, "[a]lthough there are applicable legal standards that must be met before 
the relief could be granted, a defendant is not entitled to the relief even if those 
standards are met. When those standards are met, the court still has the discretion to 
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deny the relief." State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521, _, 300 P.3d 53, 60-61 (2013). Of 
course, because Allen violated his probation (see R., pp.184-85, 187), he failed to meet 
the legal standards allowing for relief to be granted. However, even had Allen met the 
standards to allow relief, the district court would still have the discretion to deny Allen's 
motion. Allen has failed to show an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
Allen also argues that, because his version of the crime differs substantially from 
the victim's (and official) version of the crime, the district court's conclusion that the 
crime itself militated against granting a dismissal or reduction is erroneous. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.1 0-13.) The power to assess the credibility of witnesses is the sole province of 
the trier of fact, and appellate courts will not usurp that authority. See State v. Perry, 
139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 (2003). The trier of fact, in this case the 
district court, determined that Allen's version of the crime "was not credible.,,2 (R., 
p.257.) That ends the inquiry. 
Finally, Allen argues that the district court abused its discretion by not adequately 
addressing his arguments. (Appellant's brief, pp.7, 13.) Allen never specifically 
2 The district court's determination that Allen's story was not credible is thoroughly 
supported by the record. Throughout his interviews with police, Allen displayed a 
certain economy with the truth. Allen claimed to have never touched AN.A on her neck 
or head despite AN.A having suffered a concussion, a spinal injury, and visible neck 
contusions. (8/25/2009 Bennett Report, pp.3-5.) He claimed that AN.A had been 
driving his vehicle, which was untenable; the driver'S seat was set near the back and 
AN.A is less than five feet tall, whereas Allen is six feet tall. (8/26/2009 Yount Report, 
p.9.) Allen's license was expired, which likely motivated his lie. (Id.) Allen initially 
claimed that AN.A had dropped her purse on the train tracks. (8/25/2009 Bennett 
Report, p.2.) Later Allen confessed that he, in fact, put AN.A's purse by the train 
tracks. (Id., p.4.) Confronted with the sex tapes in the trunk of his car, Allen claimed to 
have made 12 tapes with only four or five different girls. (Id., p.5.) In fact, officers found 
25 tapes with at least 21 different women. (Id.) 
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identifies which arguments, if any, the court failed to "adequately address," and this 
naked assertion is belied by the record. (See R., pp.288-90.) 
Allen has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to dismiss or reduce his felony conviction pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604. 
The district court's order, denying Allen relief, should be affirmed. 
II. 
Allen Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Denying 
His Motion To Seal His Criminal Record 
A. Introduction 
Allen asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to 
seal his criminal record. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-18.) Application of the correct legal 
standards to the facts of this case, however, shows that the district court correctly 
recognized its discretion and exercised that discretion appropriately. Allen has failed to 
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Decisions by the district court to grant or deny relief under Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 32 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Turpen, 147 
Idaho 869,872,216 P.3d 627, 630 (2009). 
C. The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Determining That The 
Public's Interest In Disclosure Predominated Over Any Of Allen's Purported 
Privacy Interests In Sealing His Criminal File 
Criminal judgments cannot be sealed absent the clearest showing of an 
overriding personal privacy interest without infringing on the public's constitutional right 
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to information. As explained by the United States Supreme Court, in the context of 
criminal trials, the public has a right, protected by the First Amendment, to know what 
goes on in its courts. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 
(1980). The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment does not just 
protect expressing ideas and disseminating information, but receiving information and 
ideas. See ~ (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)); see also 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (right to publish implies a right to gather 
information). Indeed, "the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and 
the self expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw." Richmond Newspapers, 448 
U.S. at 575-76 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 
(1978)) (emphasis added). Criminal proceedings are, and have been since time 
immemorial, presumptively open. ~ at 564-74. Therefore, "[a]bsent an overriding 
interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." 
~ at 581. 
Consistent with the public's constitutional right to know what transpires in criminal 
proceedings, the Idaho Supreme Court, "pursuant to [its] authority to control access to 
court records," promulgated Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32. I.C.A.R. 32(a). At the 
beginning of Rule 32, the Idaho Supreme Court clearly laid out its statement of policy: 
The public has a right to examine and copy the judicial department's 
declarations of law and public policy and to examine and copy the records 
of all proceedings open to the public. This rule provides for access in a 
manner that: 
(1) Promotes accessibility to court records; 
(2) Supports the role of the judiciary; 
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Id. 
(3) Promotes governmental accountability; 
(4) Contributes to public safety; 
(5) Minimizes the risk of injury to individuals; 
(6) Protects individual privacy rights and interests; 
(7) Protects proprietary business information; 
(8) Minimizes reluctance to use the court system; 
(9) Makes the most effective use of court and clerk of court 
staff; 
(10) Provides excellent customer service; and 
(11) Avoids unduly burdening the ongoing business of the 
judiciary. 
In the event of any conflict this rule shall prevail over any other rule 
on the issue of access to judicial records. 
Striking a balance between the public's constitutional right to access criminal 
records and the privacy interests of individuals, Rule 32 exempts from disclosure highly 
private information, such as PSis, most unreturned warrants, documents that would 
identify jurors on a Grand Jury, and jury questionnaires. I.C.A.R. 32(g). Duly entered 
criminal judgments, however, are not exempted from disclosure under Rule 32. 
In very narrow circumstances, court records may also be sealed under Rule 
32(i). The rule does not allow the district court unfettered discretion to seal case files; 
rather, a court is only allowed to seal portions of a case file after it finds that the 
petitioner's privacy interests predominate over the public's constitutional right to know. 
I.C.A.R. 32(i). Even then, "[ilf the court redacts or seals records to protect 
predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the least restrictive exemption from 
disclosure consistent with privacy interests." Id. Accordingly, before a district court may 
seal any portion of a case file, it must first determine in writing: 
11 
Id. 
(1) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or 
statements, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a 
reasonable person, or 
(2) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements 
that the court finds might be libelous, or 
(3) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, 
the dissemination or publication of which would reasonably result in 
economic or financial loss or harm to a person having an interest in the 
documents or materials, or compromise the security of personnel, records 
or public property of or used by the judicial department, or 
(4) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements 
that might threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or 
(5) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the documents 
or materials to preserve the right to a fair trial. 
Rule 32(i) "requires that the district court 'hold a hearing on the motion' and 
'determine and make a finding of fact as to whether the interest in privacy or public 
disclosure predominates.'" State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 504, 272 P.3d 474, 476 
(2012) (quoting I.C.A.R. 32(i)). The district court does not abuse its discretion by 
denying a motion to seal a criminal record after it determines that the public's interest in 
disclosure of the criminal proceedings predominates over the petitioner's asserted 
privacy interest. kL. at 504-05, 272 P.3d at 476-77. 
Allen moved the district court to seal his criminal file under Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 32(i), claiming that he suffered economic harm because his felony 
conviction made it more difficult for him to obtain employment, that the file contained 
private third-party information, and characterizing some statements contained in the 
record as "libelous." (R., pp.274-78.) The district court, as required by Rule 32(i), held 
a hearing on Allen's motion. (Tr., pp.37-49.) At that hearing, Allen only provided 
testimony regarding his economic interest. (Tr., p.39, L.20 - p.45, L.2.) A"en, however, 
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never testified that his economic interests were harmed by having a public record of his 
felony conviction, but rather by the felony conviction itself. (See Tr., p.41, L. 14 - p. 52, 
L.1 (testifying that he could not obtain employment with government contractors due to 
his felony conviction).) Allen's evidence, therefore, did not support his motion to seal 
his criminal case file. Absent a dismissal or reduction of his felony conviction, for which 
Allen was not eligible (see Arg. I(C)(1), supra), Allen would still be required to disclose 
to employers that he was a convicted felon, regardless of whether his file was sealed. 
Thus, even if Allen's economic interests were affected by his felony conviction, those 
interests were not affected due to any legitimate privacy concerns. 
Denying Allen's motion, the district court correctly noted: 
While [Allen] believes his disclosure to prospective employers that he is a 
convicted felon hurts his chances for employment, whether or not the 
court record is sealed has not been shown to adversely affect his 
employment capabilities. Thus it appears that the major impediment to 
employment is the conviction itself. 
The district court therefore concluded that "the public interest in disclosure outweighs 
Mr. Allen's interest in privacy." (R., pp.290-91.) The district court properly exercised its 
discretion, and Allen has failed to show any abuse of that discretion. 
On appeal, Allen asserts that the district court abused its discretion, accusing the 
district court of focusing on his economic harm and, allegedly, failing to consider Allen's 
arguments below that his file contained private third-party information and that the file 
contained libelous information. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-18.) As to the alleged privacy 
interests of third parties, Allen has failed to cite any authority that would give him 
standing to assert a third party's privacy interests in sealing his criminal case file. 
Moreover, even if Allen could assert a third party's interests, he has failed to show how 
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sealing the record of his criminal conviction for attempted strangulation in any way 
protects the privacy interests of third parties. As to the allegedly libelous information, 
Allen has failed to make any showing, either below or on appeal, that there is any 
libelous information in his criminal case file. Indeed, at the hearing, Allen only produced 
evidence in regard to his economic interests. (See Tr., p.39, L.20 - p.45, L.2.) That the 
district court focused its order on the sole aspect of Allen's argument for which he had 
produced evidence is unremarkable. Allen has failed to show that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion to seal his criminal case file. 
As recognized by Rule 32, the public's constitutional right to access criminal 
records U[c]ontributes to public safety" and U[m]inimizes the risk of injury to individuals." 
See I,C.A.R. 32(a). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Allen's 
motion to seal the record of his criminal conviction after it correctly determined that 
Allen's privacy interests did not predominate over the public's interest in disclosure. 
The district court's order, denying Allen's motion to seal, should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Allen's motions to dismiss or reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor 
and to seal his criminal case file. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2013. 
s~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of October, 2013, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing two copies in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
GARY I. AMENDOLA 
Amendola, Andersen & Doty, PLLC 
702 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
CR~:: 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
15 
